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COMBATING UNREGULATED FISHING 
THROUGH UNILATERAL TRADE 
MEASURES: A TIME FOR CHANGE IN 
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES LAW? 
Osvaldo Urrutia* 
Unregulated fishing on the high seas – understood as fishing activities by vessels flagged to a non-
member state in an area regulated by a regional fisheries management organisation – are a 
significant threat to the sustainability of high seas fishery resources. The European Union (EU) and 
the United States – two major market destinations for fishery products – have shown a strong 
determination to treat unregulated fishing as illegal fishing. They have applied or threatened to apply 
trade restrictions to states that have no treaty obligations to refrain from fishing on the high seas. 
These actions are conspicuous because the practical effect of these unilateral measures entails a 
challenge to the fundamental pacta tertiis rule. This article suggests that the application of unilateral 
trade-related measures by the EU and the United States against non-member states represents 
relevant state practice for the formation of a prohibition against unregulated fishing in customary 
international law.  
I INTRODUCTION 
Unregulated fishing activities on the high seas – fishing by vessels flagged to a non-member state 
in an area regulated by a regional fisheries management organisation – are a threat to the sustainability 
of high seas fishery resources and a significant challenge to the international legal order of the oceans. 
The European Union (EU) and the United States – two major market destinations for fishery products 
– have shown a strong determination to give unregulated fishing the same treatment as illegal fishing. 
Interestingly, they have applied or threatened to apply import bans or restrictions on fishing trade to 
states that have no treaty obligations to refrain from fishing in the high seas. These actions are 
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University of Wellington. The author wishes to thank Professor Campbell McLachlan QC, Associate 
Professor Joanna Mossop and PhD student Nathan Ross for their valuable comments on early drafts of this 
article. Any errors are the author's sole responsibility.   
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conspicuous because the practical effect of these unilateral measures entails a challenge to the 
fundamental pacta tertiis rule. 
This article suggests that the application of unilateral trade-related measures by the EU and the 
United States against non-member states represents relevant state practice for the formation of 
customary international law in the treatment of unregulated fishing. This is practice coming from 
specially-affected states that is beyond the mere performance of treaty obligations and is contributing 
to an evolutionary change in opinio juris.  
The article will first introduce the topic and the legal problem that the trade measures taken by the 
EU and the United States are targeting. Part III will briefly describe the legal framework in the EU 
and the United States against states sponsoring unregulated fishing, with reference to specific cases. 
Part IV will explain why these measures should be considered as relevant state practice for the 
formation of customary law. It is beyond the scope of this article to address the question of whether 
there is a consolidated or emerging customary rule against unregulated fishing on the high seas, 
although there are good arguments for such a case and some scholars have suggested it.   
II DEFINING UNREGULATED FISHING 
A Background 
There is ample evidence about the worrying status of marine fishery resources. In 2015 more than 
33.1 per cent of fish stocks worldwide were fished at biologically unsustainable levels (overexploited), 
whereas maximally sustainably fished stocks accounted for 59.9 per cent.1 Although there are some 
encouraging cases of good management and fish stock recovery, the overall trend is alarming, and the 
problem exists both in areas under and beyond national jurisdiction. On the high seas global figures 
are difficult to obtain with accuracy but there are no reasons to be optimistic. The Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that among the seven principal tuna 
species, 43 per cent of the stocks were estimated as being fished at biologically unsustainable levels 
in 2015.2 Iconic highly migratory species such as the bluefin tuna are exploited at far from sustainable 
levels.3 
  
1  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2018: 
Meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (2018) at 40, also known as the SOFIA Report. Maximally 
sustainably fished stocks (what the FAO labelled as "fully exploited" in previous versions of the SOFIA 
Report) does not mean over-exploitation; rather, it refers to stocks where there is no more room for expansion. 
Illegal and unregulated activities, which are generally unreported add uncertainty to these numbers.  
2  At 42. 
3  The 2017 assessment undertaken by the Scientific Committee of the Commission for the Conservation of 
Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) suggested that the bluefin stock remain at a low state and below the level to 
produce maximum sustainable yield: Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna Report of 
the Twenty Second Meeting of the Scientific Committee (September 2017) at [104]. 
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Responding to this problem, states with an interest in the management and exploitation of stocks 
occurring there – including straddling and highly migratory stocks – have set up international 
organisations with specific mandates to adopt management measures for their sustainable use. 
Although definitions and powers vary in scope, they are commonly known as regional fisheries 
management organisations or regional bodies.4  
These organisations face two main challenges: the need to improve management of stocks and 
species at regional level and responding to those who do not abide by international rules. The latter 
idea is captured in the concept of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing), a much 
criticised notion5 that nevertheless has been widely accepted in international practice since its first 
adoption in a global instrument in 2001.6 Although they are often treated together, illegal and 
unregulated activities mean different things. On the high seas, illegal activities are those carried out 
against the rules adopted by a regional fisheries organisation by vessels flagged to member states. 
Unregulated fishing, in contrast, are those activities undertaken by vessels flagged to a state or entity 
that is neither a member nor a cooperating party of the relevant regional organisation. In other words: 
unregulated fishing refers to fishing against the rules of the relevant international organisations by 
vessels flagged to non-member states. 
Like the most detrimental aspects of illegal fishing, unregulated activities also cause harmful 
impacts on high seas stocks. Unregulated fishing disregards catch limits, frequently employs 
environmentally damaging techniques and does not observe seasonal or area-based restrictions. These 
vessels are usually flagged to states that have no capacity or will to exert any meaningful control, 
often referred to as flags of convenience.7 Precise figures about unregulated catches on the high seas 
  
4  The notion of "regional arrangements" should also be considered. Regional arrangements are less formal than 
a regional organisation created by treaty, but in practice their measures are similar. This article will mostly 
refer to regional fisheries management organisations, as state practice concerning the latter is sometimes not 
as extensive as it is in the former. 
5  Andrew Serdy "Pacta Tertiis and Regional Fisheries Management Mechanisms: The IUU Fishing Concept 
as an Illegitimate Short-Cut to a Legitimate Goal" (2017) 48 ODIL 345; Andrew Serdy The New Entrants 
Problem in International Fisheries Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016); and Jens T Theilen 
"What's in a Name? The Illegality of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing" (2013) 28 IJMCL 533. 
See also Rachel J Baird Aspects of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in the Southern Ocean 
(Springer, Berlin, 2006) at 12. Unreported fishing is recognised as illegal by most international regulations 
and generally regarded as a subset of IUU fishing.  
6  International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
(adopted at the 24th session of the FAO Committee of Fisheries on 2 March 2001, endorsed by the 120th 
Session of the FAO Council on 23 June 2001). 
7  Unregulated fishing occurring recently on Antarctic waters is illustrative. For more than a decade, six 
unregulated vessels operated on toothfish, a high-value fishery managed by the Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). They were flagged to non-CCAMLR 
members and operated with full disregard of the conservation measures adopted by this organisation. The 
"Asian Warrior", for example, changed its name 17 times between 2003 and 2018, and was flagged to at least 
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are difficult to obtain because they are unreported. As stock assessments can barely estimate the 
figures, unregulated fishing affects sustainable fisheries management.  
B The Legal Problem 
Unregulated fishing has been able to persist primarily through the operation of two old rules of 
international law: the freedom of fishing on the high seas and the near-exclusive jurisdiction of the 
flag state. It is not difficult to see why the well-entrenched principle of the freedom of the high seas, 
a 400-year-old Grotian notion based on the endless bounty of the open seas, is not suitable for the 
sustainable exploitation of common goods in the 21st century. The law of the sea recognises the flag 
state as the main jurisdiction entitled to regulate, control and enforce international rules beyond areas 
under national jurisdiction,8 but evidence suggests there are still many flag states with little capacity 
– or will – to ensure this happens.9 
The international community has made important efforts to curb the old Grotian notion and has 
encouraged states to act responsibly to manage fishery resources on the high seas. These have come 
mostly by states agreeing and adopting treaties containing express obligations. The 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established a general duty for coastal and 
distant water fishing nations to cooperate in the adoption of management rules for the high seas.10 
Despite the broad success of UNCLOS, the general duty to cooperate early on proved insufficient to 
serve as an efficient legal framework and to play any substantive role in constraining the most negative 
aspects of unregulated fishing on the high seas. Under UNCLOS there is no obligation to cooperate 
through a specific body or organisation for the adoption of high seas fisheries measures, and therefore 
regional bodies do not have any pre-eminent status.  
States have since then continued setting up and empowering several regional fisheries 
management organisations with the competence to regulate resources that occur on the high seas, 
including straddling and highly migratory stocks.11 An important milestone in this regard was the 
  
nine countries, including Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, North Korea and Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines. Only concerted actions by several states and unilateral measures by market 
destinations resulted in meaningful action against some of these vessels. 
8  Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson Promoting Sustainable Fisheries: The International 
Legal and Policy Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing  (Martinus Nijhoff, 
Leiden, 2010) at 110. 
9  Dana D Miller and U Rashid Sumaila "Flag Use Behaviour and IUU Activity within the International Fishing 
Fleet: Redefinitions and Identifying Areas of Concern" (2014) 44 Marine Policy 204. 
10  See for example arts 63–64 and 117–118 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 
3 (opened for signature 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS]. State practice 
and most scholars seem to confirm this duty as a customary obligation.   
11  There are approximately 17 regional fisheries organisations, or arrangements that in practice work as 
organisations (for example, through decisions of the meeting of the contracting parties), with the capacity to 
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1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA).12 This treaty establishes that when there is a 
regional fisheries body regulating high seas stocks, states whose vessels want to fish in the area must 
become party to that organisation or agree to apply its measures, otherwise they shall not authorise 
their vessels to fish.13  In effect, a state that accedes to the UNFSA accepts the obligation not to 
undertake unregulated activities; unregulated fishing becomes illegal for that contracting party by 
virtue of its treaty commitments.  
The UNFSA concept was supplemented with the adoption in 2001 of the FAO International Plan 
of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (FAO Plan of 
Action).14 The 2009 FAO Port State Measures Agreement added to this evolution by recognising the 
very same definition of the FAO International Plan of Action.15 Regional fisheries bodies today 
recognise the same notion of unregulated fishing, including those that have been established after 
UNFSA, and they generally treat fishing by non-members as contrary to the rules of their 
organisations.16  
This evolution is encouraging, and it has meant significant change in treaty obligations, but it 
leaves the core legal problem intact: according to the universally-accepted pacta tertiis rule, treaty 
  
adopt binding conservation measures for different stocks occurring on the high seas. Some examples of 
regional fisheries bodies include the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) and 
the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO), to mention a few.  
12  Agreement for the Implementation of the Provision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks 2167 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 4 December 1995, entered into force 11 December 
2001). Today it has 89 contracting parties. 
13  Articles 8(3)–(4) and 17. 
14  International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, 
above n 6, at [3.3.1] recognised the notion behind arts 8(3)–(4) and 17 of the UNFSA: unregulated fishing 
refers to fishing activities "in the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries management organization 
that are conducted by vessels without nationality, or by those flying the flag of a State not party to that 
organization, or by a fishing entity, in a manner that is not consistent with or contravenes the conservation 
and management measures of that organization". At [3.3.2] the Plan of Action included an additional category 
within the notion of "unregulated fishing" which for the purposes of this article is not relevant.  
15  Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing (opened for signature 4 December 1995, entered into force 5 June 2016). Today it has 56 contracting 
parties.  
16  See for example art 1(1)(j) of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery 
Resources in the South Pacific Ocean (opened for signature 1 February 2010, entered into force 24 August 
2012); and Conservation Measure 08/06 establishing a List of Vessels Presumed to Have Carried Out Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulationed Fishing Activities in the South-East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO) 
Convention Area (adopted by the Parties to the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization Convention, 
approved 4 April 2006). 
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provisions do not apply to fishing vessels flagged to a non-party state.17 By treaty law, if a fishing 
vessel is flagged to a non-member state the provisions of that treaty do not impose any obligation on 
them. The consequences of the strict application of the pacta tertiis rule have historically led to the 
existence of the so-called flags of convenience: free riders that fish under the flag of a non-party, 
whose control capacity is often weak or non-existent. They have for long operated outside the legal 
framework agreed by international organisations, undermining their management efforts and 
triggering an incentive for others to defect from the rules.  
Facing this challenge, states and regional fisheries organisations have adopted different strategies 
to deal with the limitations of the high seas legal framework and weak or non-cooperative flag states. 
Because they can occur in any part of the high seas, combating unregulated fishing requires the 
exercise of diverse measures demanding different jurisdictional capacities: flag state, port state, the 
state of the nationality and the market state. They all have a relevant jurisdictional link.  
Although the freedom of the high seas entails the jurisdictional primacy of the flag state,18 the 
persistence of unregulated activities strongly indicates that a considerable number of them than have 
failed to exercise it responsibly. Resting solely on the jurisdiction of the flag state is simply not 
enough. Therefore, some states have adopted bolder measures beyond the scope of targeting the 
vessels implicated in unregulated fishing. Instead, they seek to block market access to fishery products 
coming from flag states whose vessels have engaged in unregulated fishing. The following parts focus 
on the measures adopted in this regard by the EU and the United States.  
III THE EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES 
APPROACHES 
Among the many states that participate in the multilateral and decentralised system of fisheries 
governance in the high seas, the EU and the United States have played pivotal roles.19 They participate 
as active members, regularly flag vessels to fish in several regional fisheries bodies,20 and are 
  
17  Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered into 
force 27 January 1980), art 34.  
18  UNCLOS, arts 91 and 94. 
19  The legal status of the EU as an international organisation is well-known. For the sole benefit of keeping the 
language simple, this article will refer to the United States and the EU as "states". See n 87 below. 
20  In the case of the United States this includes, among others, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (WCPFC), the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), the North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC) and the 
Commission of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO). The EU actively 
participates in many of these agreements, including the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), 
NAFO, WCPFC, ICCAT and SPRFMO. 
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conspicuous market destinations for fishery products.21 Concern for the sustainability of international 
fisheries is not new in the United States and EU and their active civil society has contributed to 
bringing ocean sustainability and IUU fishing to the top of the environmental agenda. The United 
States and the EU have been active promoters and supporters of multilateral actions against illegal 
and unregulated fishing and their domestic legislations are consistent with that approach.22 In this 
context, it comes as no surprise that they have pioneered unilateral responses to IUU fishing. The 
application of these measures shows that in practice the EU and the United States are treating 
unregulated fishing as if they were illegal activities, and therefore blurring the distinction.   
Trade or market-related measures broadly seek to impose objective conditions on fishery products 
to enter a market or to deny access to a product in case those conditions are not met. Margaret Young 
has proposed to classify these measures in two groups: on the one hand, traceability and import 
restrictions, and import bans or market denial measures on the other.23 Both categories can have a 
multilateral or unilateral origin. Regional fisheries organisations have for years operated certification 
schemes in relation to some resources and member states implement them at domestic level. The EU 
and the United States have also adopted and are implementing unilateral trade and certification 
schemes targeting illegal and unregulated catches through the control of imports.24 Although these 
measures are very positive, certification schemes have some limitations, and the "laundering" of 
catches can occur through different means – not least through transhipments at sea. Therefore, 
targeting vessels and catches is necessary but not enough. The novel and bold approaches by the EU 
and the United States of directly aiming at the flag state with import bans or market denial measures 
mean a progressive change that plays a substantially more effective role in combating unregulated 
fishing. A state that may be threatened with a denial of market access for its fishery exports due to a 
failure to control one or two fishing vessels will certainly be encouraged or forced to stop free-riding 
on international rules. 
  
21  The EU represents the largest single market for fish and fishery products, followed by the United States and 
Japan. In 2016, six members of the EU (Spain, France, Italy, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom) 
accounted for approximately 25.3 per cent of the total value of world imports of fish and fish products. The 
United States is the second largest importer, representing 15.1 per cent the same year, followed by Japan with 
10.2 per cent: The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2018, above n 1, at 55. 
22  For example, as early as 2006 the EU submitted to CCAMLR a proposal allowing for the adoption of trade-
related measures against contracting parties and non-contracting parties to CCAMLR in cases of IUU fishing. 
The EU continued presenting proposals or discussion papers to this aim until 2014. The required consensus 
was opposed by several delegations for reasons that did not relate to the broad aim of combating IUU fishing.   
23  Margaret Young "International trade law compatibility of market-related measures to combat illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing" (2016) 69 Marine Policy 209 at 210. 
24  Under EU Regulation 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing [2008] OJ L286/1, the EU has implemented a catch certification scheme.  
In the case of the United States, see Final Rule on Seafood Traceability Program Title 50 CFR 300.324 
(effective 9 January 2017). 
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To be sure, states and organisations such as the EU can adopt unilateral trade measures to restrict 
or prevent access to their market of certain goods, provided they conform to the rules and exceptions 
of the World Trade Organization agreements, not least the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT 1994)25 and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.26 Young has correctly argued that 
these unilateral measures appeared to have been designed to ensure that they are fair, transparent and 
non-discriminatory.27 She has also demonstrated, in the case of unilateral trade measures addressing 
climate change – which can be reasonably compared in several grounds to those against IUU fishing 
– that they are unlikely to violate or enliven public international law rules on territorial jurisdiction 
because the importing country is regulating behaviour within or at its borders and therefore has a 
territorial basis for jurisdiction.28 It seems that, at least prima facie, if well designed and implemented, 
these measures may not represent a challenge to international trade rules. Moreover, the aim to combat 
IUU fishing conforms to legitimate objectives expressly recognised in trade law, including the 
protection of animal or plant life or health, or the environment.29 What this article wishes to highlight 
is that, despite the conceptual differences and dissimilar legal nature of illegal and unregulated fishing, 
the EU and the United States are treating them both as illegitimate and are threatening states 
promoting or sponsoring these activities with the same negative consequences through unilateral 
measures. In the context of combating IUU fishing, they add to the array of international and domestic 
actions having potential implications to develop a customary change in the rules governing high seas 
fisheries. 
  
25  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1867 UNTS 190 (opened for signature on 15 April 1994, entered 
into force 1 January 1995). 
26  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 1868 UNTS 120 (opened for signature 15 April 1994, entered into 
force 1 January 1995). 
27   Young, above n 23, at 215. 
28  Margaret Young "Trade measures to address climate change: territory and extraterritoriality" in Panagiotis 
Delimatsis (ed) Research Handbook on Climate Change and Trade Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Abingdon, 2016) 329 at 350. 
29  Young, above n 23, at 215.  
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A The European Union Regulation  
1 Import bans to non-cooperating non-European Union states 
The EU adopted on 29 September 2009 Regulation 1005/2008, establishing a Community system 
to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing (the EU Regulation).30 It explicitly covers unregulated 
activities on the high seas.31 
Chapter VI of the EU Regulation establishes a system to identify non-cooperating non-EU states 
aimed at those states failing to cooperate in the fight against IUU fishing.32 A non-EU country may 
be identified as non-cooperating:33  
… if it fails to discharge the duties incumbent upon it under international law as flag, port, coastal or 
market State, to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. 
The EU system works out in practice like a traffic light scheme: yellow (pre-identification 
warning),34 red (identification, listing and sanctions) and green lights (lifting of warnings or 
sanctions).35 The most important consequence for identified and listed non-cooperating third states is 
the trade ban established in Article 38:  
… the importation into the Community of fishery products caught by fishing vessels flying the flag of 
such countries shall be prohibited, and accordingly catch certificates accompanying such products shall 
not be accepted. 
There are no differences in the consequences attaching to illegal and unregulated activities, and 
therefore fishing by non-members states in areas regulated by a regional body may be subject to 
unilateral trade measures of this kind.   
2 A definition of unregulated fishing consistent with international instruments 
Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the EU Regulation defines unregulated fishing as part of the "illegal, 
unreported and unregulated" notion, consistently with the terms of international instruments and the 
2001 FAO Plan of Action. Article 3 of the EU Regulation refers specifically to the specific kind of 
  
30  Regulation 1005/2008, above n 24. See in general Martin Tsamenyi and others "The European Council 
Regulation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: An International Fisheries Law Perspective" 
(2010) 25 IJMCL 5. 
31  Regulation 1005/2008, above n 24, arts 1(3) and 2(4). 
32  Article 31. 
33  Article 31(3). 
34  Article 32. The Commission opens a dialogue for six months. 
35  Article 33(2) regarding identification, and arts 33 and 35 concerning listing.  
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unregulated activities this article has described, that is, those by non-members to regional fisheries 
bodies: 
Fishing vessels engaged in IUU fishing 
1. A fishing vessel shall be presumed to be engaged in IUU fishing if it is shown that, contrary to the 
conservation and management measures applicable in the fishing area concerned, it has:  
…  
k) carried out fishing activities in the area of a regional fisheries management organisation in a manner 
inconsistent with or in contravention of the conservation and management measures of that organisation 
and is flagged to a State not party to that organisation, or not cooperating with that organisation as 
established by that organisation … 
Therefore, the activities that the EU is seeking to tackle by this Regulation include those 
undertaken by non-members to the relevant regional fisheries organisation. Several provisions of the 
Regulation confirm this, including arts 11 and 31(6)(b). 
3 Enforcing the European Union Regulation against unregulated fishing 
activities 
The EU measure has seen the assessment of over 50 non-EU countries and fishing entities and 25 
had received pre-identification notifications by May 2018.36 Of them, the EU has identified and listed 
six,37 and only three remain currently listed according to ch VI of the EU Regulation.38 The whole 
process of identification, listing or delisting is not fully in the public domain and it does not allow for 
access to the complete responses of the targeted states, which makes it difficult to completely 
understand some of the motivations behind the EU decisions.  
Nevertheless, the EU publishes the decisions notifying the "yellow" and "red cards". Some of 
them contain enough details to assess how the EU treats IUU fishing in general and unregulated 
fishing in particular. Most of the states identified under the EU Regulation have been included for 
infringing relevant treaty provisions, including obligations as flag and port states, and measures 
adopted by regional fisheries management organisations. They match the definition of illegal fishing 
stricto sensu. 
  
36  Belize, Cambodia, Comoros, Curacao, Fiji, Ghana, Kiribati, Korea, Liberia, Panama, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Republic of Guinea, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Chinese Taipei/Taiwan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and 
Vietnam.  
37  Belize, Cambodia, Comoros, Republic of Guinea, Sri Lanka, and St Vincent and the Grenadines.  
38  Cambodia, Comoros, and St Vincent and the Grenadines.  
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Some flag states have been targeted for violations of multilateral rules where they are members 
of the relevant organisation. For example, in the cases of Panama (2012) and Sierra Leone (2016) the 
EU primarily based its decision on infringements of treaty obligations that these states had ratified at 
the time, such as the UNFSA or the regional body that they were members of. These are also clear 
cases of illegal fishing. 
More interestingly, the EU has held two proceedings against states sponsoring unregulated 
fishing. The cases of Togo and Cambodia in Decision 354/01 of 15 November 2012 (the Decision) 
confirm that the EU is determined to target states whose vessels have operated against the rules 
adopted by regional fisheries organisations bodies despite not being members or ratifying the relevant 
regional treaties.39   
The Decision concerning Togo and Cambodia is mostly based on general rules enshrined in 
UNCLOS or in some of its provisions that are considered customary international law. Perhaps the 
most noteworthy aspect is that, beyond any considerations of the merits of the arguments presented, 
by equating their legal consequences the EU has made the difference between illegal and unregulated 
fishing close to meaningless.  
(a) Decision on Togo  
Paragraphs 340–383 of the Decision justify the EU's pre-identification or "yellow card" in respect 
to Togo. The country was for years a conspicuous flag of convenience, showing no will for controlling 
fishing vessels registered under its flag. The EU Decision presented ample evidence of at least 11 
vessels flagged to Togo included in regional fisheries bodies' blacklists such as the International 
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) and the Commission for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).40 Interestingly, Togo is not a contracting party or 
cooperative non-member to any of these organisations and it is not a party to the UNFSA either.41 In 
  
39  Commission Decision 354/01 on notifying the third countries that the Commission considers as possible of 
being identified as non-cooperating third countries [2012] OJ C354/1 [EU Decision]. The Decision notified 
eight states of "the possibility of being identified as third countries that the Commission considers as non-
cooperating third countries in fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing": Sole Article. The eight 
countries were Belize, Fiji, Guinea, Panama, Sri Lanka and Vanuatu, in addition to Togo and Cambodia. This 
"yellow card" was lifted for Togo in October 2014, but Cambodia was identified and remains listed as of July 
2018 as a "red card" country.  
40  This article avoids the discussion on whether CCAMLR is a proper regional fisheries management 
organisation or not. Although there can be no doubt that originally CCAMLR did not qualify as a fisheries 
body, in practice it now fulfils a very similar role in its area of competence. For the purposes of this article 
and the assessment of state practice, CCAMLR is regarded as an international body with fisheries competence 
akin to regional fisheries management organisations.  
41  UNCLOS is the only relevant agreement Togo has ratified.  
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this sense, the activities of the Togolese fleet on the high seas were by all definitions unregulated 
fishing.  
The reasons motivating the measures against Togo were essentially three violations of UNCLOS: 
flag state responsibilities under Article 94, the duty to cooperate to adopt conservation measures on 
the high seas under arts 117–118, and the general obligation on enforcement by flag states under 
Article 217. 
On flag state responsibilities, the Decision was grounded on a broad interpretation of Article 94 
of UNCLOS. Paragraph 350 of the EU Decision says that:  
In this respect it is recalled that, pursuant to Article 94(1) and (2) of the UNCLOS, every State shall 
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control over ships flying its flag. 
Article 94 refers primarily to the duties of the flag state to ensure safety at sea. However, it is 
under the general provisions of Part VII, and perhaps because of this the EU considered that the 
existence of vessels in the IUU lists of relevant regional fisheries organisations flagged to Togo was 
"a clear indication that Togo has failed to undertake its flag State responsibilities under international 
law".42  
Indeed, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) recognised in 2015 that there 
is a link between Article 94 and the flag state responsibilities in terms of fisheries conservation.43 
ITLOS concluded then that the flag state must, in fulfilment of its responsibilities to exercise effective 
jurisdiction and control in administrative matters:44 
  
42  Regulation 1005/2008, above n 24, at [350]. 
43  Request for Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (Advisory Opinion) 
[2015] ITLOS Rep 4 at [117] and [119] [2015 Advisory Opinion]. Since art 194(2) of UNCLOS starts with 
the words "in particular", ITLOS concluded at [117] that "the list of measures that are to be taken by the flag 
states to endure effective exercise of its jurisdiction and control over ships flying its flag in administrative, 
technical and social matters is only indicative, not exhaustive". In his separate opinion, Judge Paik partially 
criticised and attempted to further develop this conclusion of the Tribunal. He stated that "there is no clear 
provision in the Convention that specifically addresses flag State obligations concerning IUU fishing, yet 
there have been significant legal developments related to this issue since the adoption of the Convention": 
Separate Opinion of Judge Paik at 104. 
44  This is an obligation of conduct, not of result. At [129] of its 2015 Advisory Opinion, above n 43, ITLOS 
stated that "this is an obligation 'to deploy adequate means, to exercise best possible efforts, to do the utmost' 
to prevent IUU fishing by ships flying its flag. However, as an obligation 'of conduct' this is a 'due diligence 
obligation', not an obligation 'of result'. This means that this is not an obligation of the flag state to achieve 
compliance by fishing vessels flying its flag in each case with the requirement not to engage in IUU fishing 
… The flag state is under the 'due diligence obligation' to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance 
and to prevent IUU fishing by fishing vessels flying its flag." ITLOS built upon previous jurisprudence by the 
International Court of Justice in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) [2010] ICJ Rep 14; 
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… adopt the necessary administrative measures to ensure that fishing vessels flying its flag are not 
involved in activities which will undermine the flag State’s responsibilities under the Convention in 
respect of the conservation and management of marine living resources.  
Under this interpretation, flag state responsibility is intrinsically connected to the conservation of 
marine living resources.  
Although the 2015 ITLOS Advisory Opinion was aimed at activities occurring in the exclusive 
economic zone of a coastal state by vessels flagged to a foreign state, this criterion is perfectly valid 
in the wider context of the high seas. Yet even if this interpretation had been in place at the time of 
the EU Decision, it is not fully clear how Article 94 applies to the actions of Togo as a flag state on 
the high seas, except if one understands that the problem is precisely its failure to comply with the 
conservation and management measures adopted by regional organisations to which Togo is not a 
party and to which it has no obligation to become a member of or to cooperate with, at least under 
treaty law. Moreover, Togo is not a contracting party to the relevant agreements that explicitly 
enshrined the obligations of flag states regarding responsible fisheries on the high seas, including the 
1993 FAO Compliance Agreement45 and the UNFSA. In this context, it is significant that for the EU 
the very fact that there were Togolese vessels in the IUU lists of regional fisheries bodies showed 
that:46 
Togo has failed to exercise its responsibilities effectively, to comply with RFMO conservation and 
management measures and to ensure that its vessels do not engage in any activity which undermines the 
effectiveness of such measures. 
This drafting clearly points at Togo's non-compliance with existing rules, which highlights the 
underlying rationale of this part of the EU Decision: fishing on the high seas disregarding the 
conservation measures adopted by the relevant regional fisheries organisation is a violation of flag 
state duties.   
In respect of arts 117–118 of UNCLOS, the EU Decision noted at [352] that the number of IUU 
vessels carrying the flag of Togo "highlights the failure of Togo to fulfil its flag State obligations" of 
cooperation under UNCLOS. Although it was evident, the EU did not elaborate on how exactly Togo's 
behaviour was a breach of the UNCLOS duty to cooperate, but the same rationale suggested in the 
previous paragraphs holds true here: the EU measures were prompted because of the lack of 
cooperation with the relevant regional organisation. Therefore, if there is a standing regional body 
  
and ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber in Responsibilities and obligations of states with respect to activities 
in the Area (Advisory Opinion) [2011] ITLOS Rep 10.  
45  Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing 
Vessels on the High Seas 2221 UNTS 120 (opened for signature 24 November 1993, entered into force 24 
April 2003).  
46  EU Decision, above n 39, at [350].  
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with the legitimate mandate to adopt binding rules for the high seas, then fishing in that area is no 
longer acceptable unless the flag state is a member of that body or cooperates with it. The inclusion 
of Togolese vessels in the IUU lists showed that this obligation was not fulfilled and reveals the 
content of an obligation that goes beyond the more abstract "duty to cooperate" under arts 117–118 
of UNCLOS.   
Finally, the EU Decision also invoked Article 217 of UNCLOS on marine pollution, whereby 
states shall ensure compliance by vessels flying their flag with applicable international rules and 
standards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment from 
vessels. Although this article is contained in Part XII of UNCLOS, which has not been traditionally 
associated to fisheries conservation and management, recent developments have confirmed the link 
between the conservation of marine living resources and the protection of the environment in a broad 
sense.47 Accepting and celebrating the recognition of this link, the EU Decision could have benefited 
from a more substantial analysis on how exactly the activities by the Togolese vessels violated the 
general duty enshrined in Part XII of UNCLOS.48  
(b) Decision on Cambodia 
In the case of Cambodia there were some additional legal complexities. Cambodia is neither a 
party to the UNFSA nor to any regional fisheries management organisation or body. Unlike Togo, 
Cambodia has not even acceded to UNCLOS.49 The unregulated activities addressed by the EU 
included two Cambodian-flagged vessels operating in Antarctic waters in 2010 with utter disregard 
for the rules adopted by CCAMLR as the relevant regional body. In general, the drafting of the 
Decision was like the case of Togo,50 but it needed legal arguments beyond the law of treaties to 
  
47  Indeed, this link was first recognised in 1999 in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (New Zealand v Japan; 
Australia v Japan) (Provisional Measures) [1999] ITLOS Rep 280 at [70]: "the conservation of the living 
resources of the sea is an element in the protection and preservation of the marine environment". In its 2015 
Advisory Opinion, above n 43, at [120] and [216] ITLOS recognised this interpretation, linking the duty to 
preserve the marine environment with arts 56 and 58 of UNCLOS and the rights and obligations applicable 
to states within the exclusive economic zone.  
48  For example, the 2016 Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration confirmed this 
interpretation and went further stating that "adopting appropriate rules and measures to prohibit a harmful 
practice is only one component of the due diligence required by states pursuant to the general obligation of 
Article 192, read in the context of Article 194(5) and the international law applicable to endangered species": 
South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v China) (Award) PCA 2013-19 12 July 2016 at [964]. The Tribunal 
was referring to the harvesting of protected species such as marine turtles, giant clams and corals by Chinese 
fishermen. In the case of the IUU fishing activities by Togolese vessels, the EU Decision, above n 39, did not 
explicitly explain how this general duty to preserve the environment was contravened. 
49  The EU Decision, above n 39, at [71] and [88] recognises that Cambodia did ratify the Convention on the 
High Seas 450 UNTS 11 (opened for signature 29 April 1958, entered into force 30 September 1962). 
50  See for example EU Decision, above n 39, at [75], [77] and [82]–[83] on flag state responsibility and "the 
failure of Cambodia to honour its responsibilities". 
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conclude that "the existence of IUU vessels" in the regional fisheries organisations lists that carried 
the flag of Cambodia "are clear indications that Cambodia has failed to undertake its flag State 
responsibilities under international law".51 
The Decision resorted to some UNCLOS provisions that were identified as customary 
international law. The Decision states that arts 86–115 "on the navigation in the high seas … have 
been recognised as customary international law" and that, on this matter, the UNCLOS articles "codify 
pre-existing rules of customary international law and take over almost verbatim the wording of the 
Convention on the High Seas", which Cambodia has ratified.52 For this reason, "it is immaterial 
whether Cambodia has actually ratified" UNCLOS. There is nothing wrong in arguing that arts 91 
and 94, or indeed arts 117–118 of UNCLOS are part of customary international law, as they highly 
likely are. But this assertion does not solve an important problem akin to the situation of Togo: the 
obligation to cooperate by ensuring that vessels do not engage in unregulated fishing on the high seas 
cannot be traced to UNCLOS, as it was first recognised in a general international instrument by the 
UNFSA.53 The arguments against Cambodia regarding its lack of cooperation and non-compliance 
with flag state responsibilities cannot be understood unless one interprets them as having the following 
specific content: that flag states have an obligation to cooperate with the relevant regional fisheries 
organisation and to control their vessels so that they comply with existing regulations adopted by such 
bodies.    
(c) A positive assessment  
There is much to praise in the EU Decision. If one considers some of these arguments as purely 
static they may look sometimes unconvincing. After all, the EU Decision had to circumvent the pacta 
tertiis rule and this is always a challenging obstacle in the language of treaty law. But the arguments 
put forward by the EU seem to show that the evolution of international fisheries law for the high seas 
is still in a state of flux. The notion of IUU fishing is often repeated like a mantra and indeed there is 
vagueness in its scope. Yet the underlying focus and motivation of the EU Decision regarding Togo 
and Cambodia seems to be the fundamental illegitimacy of unregulated activities on the high seas, 
and the efforts to bring them one step closer to illegality. It is here where the merits of the EU Decision 
rest: its long-term implications for combating IUU fishing and the progressive development of the 
legal tools available to such purpose. The United States' approach is not too far from that of the EU.   
  
51  At [77]. 
52  EU Decision, above n 39, at [70].  
53  Mercedes Rosello "Cooperation and unregulated fishing: interactions between customary international law, 
and the European Union IUU fishing regulation" (2017) 84 Marine Policy 306 at 308. 
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B Market Measures in Unilateral Practice: The United States Approach 
The United States has also envisaged a system with roughly the same two broad elements 
described in the case of the EU: a traceability scheme and an identification process aimed at targeting 
non-compliant third countries. As in the EU case, this article is only concerned with the latter.  
1 Process for identification and sanctioning third countries   
The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Reauthorization Act 200654 introduced 
substantive modifications in the United States legal fisheries framework, including on ss 603–610 of 
the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act 1992 (the Moratorium Protection Act).55 
Sections 607 and 609 of the Moratorium Protection Act, as amended, require the Secretary of 
Commerce to publish a biennial report to Congress, identifying and listing countries that are or have 
been engaged in the preceding two years in IUU fishing.56 If the identified countries fail to take actions 
they receive a negative certification.57 In this case, they will face sanctions under the High Seas 
Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act 1992, including prohibition of imports to the United States.58 The 
relevant administrative authority, the National Marine Fisheries Service of the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), published  in 2011 a Final Rule on the procedure to implement 
the identification and certification provisions of the Moratorium Protection Act, including for 
unregulated fishing.59 The 2011 procedure was modified in 2013, with some changes in the definition 
of "IUU fishing" that made clear the intention to reach activities undertaken by non-members of 
regional fisheries organisations to which the United States is a party.60  
2 The United States domestic definitions of unregulated fishing activities 
Unlike the EU, the United States has adopted in practice two different definitions for unregulated 
activities, depending on the purposes for each one. The simplest one relates to the domestic 
implementation of the 2009 FAO Port State Measures Agreement. In implementing this treaty, the 
  
54  16 USC § 1801.  
55  More recently, the Shark Conservation Act 2010 and the Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing 
Enforcement Act 2015 also amended the Moratorium Protection Act. 
56  16 USC § 1826h and § 1826j. This is also extended to fishing activities resulting in bycatch of species 
protected, as defined by the Moratorium Protection Act.  
57  16 USC § 1826j(d). The Secretary of Commerce must certify to Congress whether an identified nation has 
taken appropriate corrective action to address the activities for which it has been identified. In practice, after 
notifying the countries of their identifications, the United States Government consults extensively with the 
authorities of those countries. 
58  High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act 16 USC 1826d. 
59  50 CFR § 300, Federal Register Vol 76 No 8 (12 January 2011) at 2011. 
60  50 CFR § 300.201, Federal Register Vol 78 No 11 (16 January 2013) at 3338 and 3342. 
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Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Enforcement Act 2015 defined unregulated fishing with 
full reference to the 2001 FAO Plan of Action.61 
In addition to this first definition, the Moratorium Protection Act had established a concept for 
unregulated fishing within the more limited scope of the identification of foreign nations whose 
vessels have engaged in IUU fishing. Section 609(e)(1)–(3) asserts that the Secretary of Commerce 
shall publish a definition of the term "illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing" for purposes of this 
Act,62 and that the Secretary shall include certain guidelines as a minimum.63 The subsequent 
Secretary's definition shows that the United States includes under the notion of unregulated fishing 
activities from contracting parties and non-members to the relevant regional fisheries agreement as 
long as the United States is a party itself.64 Confirmation of this approach is the Final Rule adopted 
by the National Marine Fisheries Service in January 2013, where s 300.201 says that "illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing means":65  
(2) In the case of non-parties to an international fishery management agreement to which the United States 
is a party, fishing activities that would undermine the conservation of the resources managed under the 
agreement. 
  
61  16 USC § 7402.2: "The term 'IUU fishing' means any activity set out in paragraph 3 of the 2001 FAO 
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing."  
62  16 USC § 1826j. Section 609 was added by s 403 of the Reauthorisation Act. 
63  16 USC § 1826j(e)(3). The definition of unregulated fishing must include: "(A) fishing activities that violate 
conservation and management measures required under an international fishery management agreement to 
which the United States is a party, including catch limits or quotas, capacity restrictions, bycatch reduction 
requirements, and shark conservation measures; (B) overfishing of fish stocks shared by the United States, 
for which there are no applicable international conservation or management measures or in areas with no 
applicable international fishery management organization or agreement, that has adverse impacts on such 
stocks; and (C) fishing activity that has an adverse impact on seamounts, hydrothermal vents, and cold water 
corals located beyond national jurisdiction, for which there are no applicable conservation or management 
measures or in areas with no applicable international fishery management organization or agreement." 
64  50 CFR § 300, above n 59, at 2024. 
65  50 CFR § 300.201, above n 60, at 3342–3343. This is also confirmed by the last 2017 report: United States 
Department of Commerce Improving International Fisheries Management: Report to Congress Pursuant to 
Section 403(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006 
(January 2017) at 19. In relation to activities "Undermining RFMO Conservation by Non-Parties" on the high 
seas, it expressly states: "Under this aspect of the IUU fishing definition, a nation may be identified for fishing 
activities that undermine the conservation of resources under an international fishery management agreement 
to which the United Sates is a party, despite the fact that a nation is not a party to the agreement." Past Biennial 
Reports to the United States Congress are consistent with this approach. The express recognition of this 
intention by the executive branch of the United States Government, in a formal communication to Congress, 
clearly underlines the intention and potential reach of the United States scheme. 
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Therefore, the key component of the notion of unregulated fishing is maintained, as it refers to 
states that are neither party nor cooperating non-members of the relevant regional fisheries body. 
3 Appling the United States measures to third-party states 
There have been few cases in the practice and implementation of the United States legislation 
linked to what is strictly speaking unregulated fishing. The Secretary of Commerce presented the first 
biennial report to Congress in 2009 and subsequent reports in 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017. Although 
the last 2017 report could only identify illegal activities coming from states party to the relevant 
regional fisheries bodies,66 past reports did refer to unregulated activities. The 2015 report identified 
and certified six foreign states.67 Nigeria was included for violations of conservation measures 
adopted by CCAMLR, to which it was not a contracting party. However, as Nigeria has been a 
contracting party to the UNFSA since 2009, it could be argued that they were not unregulated 
activities because the relevant treaty provisions apply.68 Rather than being unregulated, the activities 
by the Nigerian-flagged vessels may be considered as illegal.69  
Two better examples are found in the 2009 and 2013 biennial reports. The 2009 report identified 
Panama as having two vessels operating around the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization area 
in 2007 and 2008.70 Panama is not a member of this organisation, and it acceded to the UNFSA only 
in December 2008. At the time of the infringements reported to the United States Congress, Panama's 
activities in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization area were thus fully unregulated.  
More recently, the 2013 report identified Tanzania as four of its vessels were included in the list 
of non-Contracting Parties vessels engaged in IUU fishing activities in CCAMLR, and "they 
  
66  Ecuador in respect of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) and Russia in CCAMLR. 
United States Department of Commerce Improving International Fisheries Management: Report to Congress 
(January 2017) at 24. 
67  United States Department of Commerce Improving International Fisheries Management: Report to Congress 
Pursuant to Section 403(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization 
Act of 2006 (February 2015). 
68  UNFSA, arts 8(3)–(4) and 17. 
69  This is assuming that CCAMLR can be regarded as a regional fisheries management organisation for the 
application of the UNFSA provisions, which is far from clear. Therefore this statement is not free from 
criticism and indeed deserves more analysis, which is beyond the scope of this article. However, if CCAMLR 
cannot be considered as a body to which the UNFSA provisions apply, the activities undertaken by Nigerian-
flagged vessels are then plainly unregulated.  
70  United States Department of Commerce Improving International Fisheries Management: Report to Congress 
Pursuant to Section 403(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization 
Act of 2006 (January 2009) at 94. 
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undermined the effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures".71 Tanzania is not a member of 
the CCAMLR Commission, is not a contracting party to the CCAMLR Convention and it has not 
ratified the UNFSA. 
These two last cases highlight the unequivocal will of the United States to adopt trade restrictive 
measures for fishery products coming from unregulated activities. Unlike the EU – which attempted 
to find an explicit legal rationale for the countries identified as undertaking unregulated activities – 
the United States has not particularly focused on the legal argumentation of the identification 
decisions. What remains important is that both schemes have proven effective tools to target 
unregulated fishing. The practical consequence is evident: the United States and the EU have treated 
fishing by vessels flagged to non-parties to the relevant regional fisheries organisation as subject to 
the same measures and consequences as those they apply to illegal fishing.  
IV TIME FOR CHANGE? THE EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED 
STATES ACTION AS RELEVANT PRACTICE FOR THE 
FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The cases introduced above show a strong determination by two of the most important world 
market destinations for fishery products to tackle unregulated fishing. Beyond the merits or possible 
pitfalls of the legal argumentation presented by the EU, and notwithstanding the lack of explicit 
justification for the United States' actions, what these two cases show is that unilateral actions against 
non-party states are a reality. This entails, in practice, equating unregulated fishing to illegal fishing 
despite the challenge represented by the pacta tertiis rule. 
1  An emerging customary international rule? 
One possible explanation for the EU and United States' measures – and the apparent acceptance 
of those targeted by them – lies in the recent emergence of a new customary rule prohibiting 
unregulated fishing. In other words, these actions suggest that the hard core of the obligations 
recognised in arts 8(3)–(4) and 17 in the UNFSA concerning non-parties to regional fisheries bodies 
is becoming customary; either a state is a member of the regional fisheries organisation or cooperates 
to apply its rules, or the vessels flagged to that state shall refrain from fishing. If this has indeed been 
realised, it would mean that a violation of the multilateral measures adopted by regional fisheries 
bodies by non-party vessels would trigger the responsibility of the flag state, and all the consequences 
of breaching a primary rule of international law. 
This question is not new. For example, Erik Molenaar suggested in 2004 that "the strengthened 
duty to co-operate with [regional fisheries organisations] pursuant to Article 8(3) of the [UNFSA] has 
  
71  United States Department of Commerce Improving International Fisheries Management: Report to Congress 
Pursuant to Section 403(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization 
Act of 2006 (January 2013) at 30.   
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already evolved into customary international law".72 However, he warned that an authoritative 
confirmation of the correctness of this assertion might not be available until such time as these 
organisations accept the need for bolder measures against non-cooperating non-members.73 Rosemary 
Rayfuse argued in 2005 that the key treaty provisions of the UNFSA prohibiting unregulated fishing 
had become customary and therefore binding on every member of the international community.74 
Referring to this duty, she asserted that "it is arguable that [it] may now be binding on all States as a 
matter of customary international law".75 She was later more cautious and avoided concluding that 
there was a rule binding on all states.76  
Other scholars reject this claim, questioning whether state practice and opinio juris are ripe enough 
for such an allegation.77 Despite the different views about the status of this emerging rule, it seems 
that in general scholars do not deny that a prohibition on unregulated fishing on the high seas could 
potentially emerge as customary. For example, Andrew Serdy stated that some of the provisions of 
the UNFSA, including Article 8, "are certainly susceptible of transformation into custom".78 He 
recently recognised that "these days there is a reasonably strong argument to be made for the case" 
that Article 8(3)–(4) of the UNFSA have become customary, although he warns of the problems this 
outcome represents if there is no recognition of the right of new entrants to the fishery as part of the 
same rule.79 
Concluding whether a customary rule prohibiting unregulated fishing on the high seas has 
materialised into customary law is certainly beyond the scope of this article. Such a task would entail 
assessing the development of the two constitutive elements of customary law, state practice and opinio 
  
72  EJ Molenaar "Unregulated Deep-Sea Fisheries: A Need for a Multi-Level Approach" (2004) 19 IJMCL 223 
at 231. 
73  At 231 
74  Rosemary Rayfuse "To Our Children's Children's Children: From Promoting to Achieving Compliance in 
High Seas Fisheries" (2005) 20 IJMCL 509. She refers to art 8(3)–(4) of the UNFSA.  
75  At 525. 
76  Rosemary Rayfuse "Non-flag State Enforcement and Protection of the Marine Environment: Responding to 
IUU Fishing" in Myron H Nordquist and others (eds) Freedom of Seas, Passage Rights and the 1982 Law of 
the Sea Convention (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2009) 573.  
77  Theilen, above n 5; and Moritaka Hayashi "Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and Non-
Members" in Tafsir Malick Ndiaye and Rudiger Wolfrum (eds) Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and 
Settlement of Disputes: Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A Mensah (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 
2007) 751. More recently, see also Rosello, above n 53, at 308. 
78  Andrew Serdy "Postmodern International Fisheries Law, or We Are All Coastal States Now" (2011) 60 ICLQ 
387 at 389. 
79  Andrew Serdy "Pacta Tertiis and Regional Fisheries Management Mechanisms", above n 5, at 349–350. The 
scope of his argument certainly exceeds the purpose of this article.  
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juris. If such a rule is not consolidated but at least emerging, the point this article makes is simple: the 
unilateral actions by the EU and the United States should be regarded as relevant practice 
underpinning or influencing a potential customary change in the law of the high seas, whereby fishing 
against the rules of regional fisheries bodies by vessels flagged to non-member states is regarded and 
treated as illegal.  
To postulate that the actions by the EU and the United States represent state practice shaping a 
change in the international law of the high seas needs certain clarifications. Although international 
customary law may be difficult to identify, it certainly exists and is still a relevant, universal source 
of international law with a key systemic role to play. Problems may lie as to the method to identify a 
new or emerging rule. Deductive approaches, for example, are usually detached from a sense of reality 
(utopian) and based on considerations in close interplay between law and moral values.80 These 
approaches are clearly unsuited for the case of unregulated fishing, even if the sustainable exploitation 
of marine biodiversity is not necessarily exempt from moral considerations. To avoid aspirational 
claims, the work of the International Law Commission81 should be a reasonable starting point – closer 
to a classic, inductive methodology – yet some of its ambiguities may need clarification against the 
positions adopted by scholarly works such as the International Law Association and others.82 
2 Content of state practice 
There should be no doubt that the actions taken by both the EU and the United States constitute 
state practice in a material sense. Draft conclusion 6(7) of the International Law Commission on forms 
of practice says that "[m]anifestations of practice include, among others" conduct in connection with 
treaties and legislative and administrative acts.83 State practice, as a fundamental element of 
customary international law, means that it must be general, uniform and consistent over a certain 
period of time.84 The actions taken by the EU and the United States may not have reached that status 
  
80  This is sometimes the case with international criminal and humanitarian law, and to a certain point with 
international human rights. As way of example, the approach of the International Court for the Former 
Yugoslavia in the Kupreskic case has been often quoted. Here the Tribunal held that the opinio element could 
crystallise "as a result of imperatives of humanity or public conscience" and it "may turn out to be the decisive 
element heralding the emergence of a general rule or principle of humanitarian law": Prosecutor v Kupreskic 
(Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000 at [527]. 
81  Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-eighth session UN Doc A/71/10 (22 
February 2016) at [50]–[63]. 
82  See International Law Association London Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General 
Customary Law Resolution 16/2000: Formation of General Customary International Law (adopted at the 
sixty-ninth Conference of the International Law Association, London, 29 July 2000) [London Statement]. 
83  Michael Wood Second report on identification of customary international law UN Doc A/CN.4/672 35 (2014) 
at [48]. 
84  At [15]–[41]. See also London Statement, above n 82, at 20–29; and James Crawford Brownlie's Principles 
of Public International Law (8th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 24–25. 
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yet, but they would probably need to be assessed and compared along other relevant pieces of practice 
at both multilateral and unilateral levels.  
An additional important point to make here is that practice coming from the EU and United States 
is relevant because they may be regarded as specially-affected states.85 The International Court of 
Justice put it clearly in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases: when assessing whether a rule 
contained in a treaty has passed into custom, the Court said that widespread and representative 
participation in the treaty might suffice provided it included that of states whose interests were 
specially affected.86 The actions and inactions of these states are critical to ascertain what sort of state 
practice needs more attention. And yet for all the importance attached to this notion by the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, the concept was not developed or mentioned again by the International Court 
of Justice, and it has not received as much attention by scholars at it deserves.87 
The whole international community has an interest in the regulation of the common goods, but 
not every state has fishing vessels operating under its flag on the high seas and this basic fact is 
significant for the development of customary law in international fisheries. Coastal nations whose 
vessels operate for straddling or highly migratory stocks are relevant states in the sense that any 
emerging or new customary rule may affect their interests. The same happens with distant water 
nations and entities that have maintained a regular presence on the high seas. Indeed, some of them 
are at the same time coastal and distant water fishing states. Equally important, practice should include 
the so-called flags of convenience, as they are the main target of the likely sanctions by market 
destinations such as the EU and United States: silence and acquiesce should be interpreted as a step 
in the formation of a new rule. Although all these states would be affected by any change on the legal 
framework for high seas fisheries, it does not mean that their interests should be considered 
automatically as specially affected.  
  
85  The article assumes that the practice of the European Commission regarding fisheries and related to the EU 
Fisheries Policy represents, at least partially, the practice of its member states. Article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty 
asserts that "The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas: (d) the conservation of marine 
biological resources under the common fisheries policy": Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community 2702 UNTS 1 (signed 13 December 2007, 
entered into force 1 December 2009). 
86  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark, Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands) (Merits) [1969] ICJ Rep 3 at 43: "With respect to the other elements usually regarded 
as necessary before a conventional rule can be considered to have become a general rule of international law, 
it might be that, even without the passage of any considerable period of time, a very widespread and 
representative participation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose 
interests were specially affected." 
87  A recent exception is the contribution by Kevin Jon Heller "Specially-affected states and the formation of 
custom" (2018) 112 AJIL 191. Although mostly focused on international humanitarian law, see also Shelly 
Aviv Yeini "The Specially-Affecting States Doctrine" (2018) 112 AJIL 244. 
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Having said that, in the context of this article there seems to be good reasons to apply the notion 
of specially-affected states to the United States and the EU, at least prima facie, as they are at the 
same time coastal states, distant water fishing players – strongly in the case of the EU – and the two 
biggest market destinations for fishery products.88 This recognition does not, of course, prevent the 
existence of further specially-affected states, including those that may oppose any customary change 
on the high seas. Its potential importance should be immediately qualified by the assertion that the 
status of specially-affected state does not confer any veto power in the development of customary 
international law.89   
3 The relationship between treaty and customary international law 
Just as the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases did almost 50 years ago,90 Draft Conclusion 11(12) 
of the International Law Commission work recognises that a treaty may codify an existing customary 
rule, lead to its crystallisation, or give rise to a general practice accepted as law.91 The last situation 
aptly describes the case of the prohibition of unregulated fishing on the high seas, for some provisions 
of the UNFSA indeed contain the core obligation that may be emerging as custom (Articles 8(3)–(4) 
and 17). 
When it comes to analysing whether a treaty provision has become or is becoming customary, the 
issue of membership to treaties becomes relevant. In the case of the unilateral measures adopted by 
the EU and the United States, they have mostly targeted states that are members to the relevant 
fisheries organisations or are part of the UNFSA. There is agreement that this sort of practice is not 
enough to advance a customary change: they should be understood as requests to perform treaty 
obligations. The practice that counts is that of non-members, or that of treaty parties interacting with 
non-contracting parties. As Crawford has demonstrated, treaty participation is simply not enough to 
develop customary international law.92 This is the reason why the EU and United States actions 
presented in this article are relevant: it is practice outside the context of treaty obligations and vis-à-
vis non-parties. The unilateral measures adopted against non-members states such as Togo, Cambodia 
and Tanzania – and their reactions or acquiescence – prove that such specific practice can occur.  
  
88  The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2018, above n 1, at 21. 
89  KJ Heller correctly stated that: "Such power is irreconcilable, however, with even the thinnest understanding 
of sovereign equality. Giving specially-affected States more power over custom formation than non-specially-
affected States is one thing; permitting one specially-affected state to block the formation of a customary rule 
that is supported by every other specially-affected state is quite another." Heller, above n 87, at 233–234. 
90  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, above n 86, at 39. 
91  International Law Commission Text of the draft conclusions provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee, 
Identification of customary international law UN Doc A/CN.4/L.872 (30 May 2016). 
92  James Crawford "Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law" (2013) 365 Recueil des Cours 9 
at 107. 
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4 How to measure opinio juris 
The belief that an action or omission is an obligation – or a right – under international law is often 
captured in the notion of opinio juris. Many of the difficulties in understanding contemporary 
customary international law derive from the need to accommodate this rather obscure notion.93 Yet 
one certainty is the impossibility of entirely disregarding opinio.94 The complexities range from 
identifying a proper belief inside the state95 to the more philosophical questions about why customary 
law should be binding.96 
The actual content of opinio is the subject of a never-ending debate with a wide array of different 
narratives by scholars.97 A generally accepted and adequately realistic view suggests that opinio 
develops over a dialectic process: it moves forward initially by some states articulating a new rule 
backed by action and the responses by other members of the international community over time, 
including acceptance, acquiescence or rejection.98 As Mendelson rightly depicts it, consent may be a 
sufficient condition for being bound, but it has never been a necessary condition.99 Therefore, the 
subjective element does not necessarily need to exist at the formation of the customary rule.100 Indeed, 
the case of unregulated fishing seems to confirm that opinio juris behaves differently depending on 
the development stage of the rule in question. The search for the subjective element should not 
necessarily look for a well-established belief of obligation.  
  
93  The expression does not have a literal Roman origin and it does not have a clear meaning. James Crawford 
calls this element "an interloper": Crawford, above n 84, at 52. 
94  Although a minority, some scholars argue that "opinio" is the central element in the formation of custom. See 
Tullio Treves "Customary International Law" in R Wolfrum (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 937 at 939. 
95  Michael Akehurst "Custom as a Source of International Law" (1975) 47 British Yearbook of International 
Law 1 at 36 and 37. He criticises the idea of "belief".  
96  Karol Wolfke Custom in Present International Law (2nd ed, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1993) 
at 160–168; and Gerald Postema "Custom in International Law as a Normative Practice" in A Perreau-
Saussine and JB Murphy (eds) The Nature of Customary International Law: Legal, Historical and 
Philosophical Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007) 279 at 282. 
97  The list of references would be extensive. For some of the most authoritative accounts see Maurice H 
Mendelson "The Formation of Customary International Law" (1998) 272 Recueil des Cours 155 at 195–196; 
Hugh Thirlway The Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) at 56–57; 
Crawford, above n 84; and Alain Pellet "Article 38" in A Zimmermann and others (eds) The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice: A Commentary (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 731.  
98  Crawford, above n 84, at 66. 
99  Mendelson, above n 97, at 260.  
100  See for example London Statement, above n 82, at 7–10. 
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This contextualisation helps to understand why the EU and United States' actions should not be 
measured against the high bar of a consolidated belief on the prohibition against unregulated fishing 
on the high seas. Opinio should be therefore assessed and understood as an evolving belief rather than 
a positive and clear sense of obligation. The bilateral and multilateral actions of specially-affected 
states such as the trade measures applied by the EU and the United States are key steps in the 
development of this belief, for it is practice coming from contracting parties to the UNFSA and the 
regional fisheries treaties vis-à-vis states that are not party or members to them. In the same vein, the 
reactions by those states targeted by the EU and United States are also relevant: in the present case, 
they seemed to have responded with either acceptance or acquiescence. 
V CONCLUSIONS 
This article has offered a case that shows how unilateral measures adopted by two relevant state 
actors may prompt change in the international law of the high seas.  
The unilateral trade measures adopted by the EU and the United States and explored in this article 
are novel in the sense that they have equated unregulated fishing with illegal fishing in terms of the 
legal consequences attached to them. The EU and United States' measures have in practice blurred 
this distinction or plainly rendered it irrelevant.  
This article has suggested that the EU and United States' trade measures should be regarded as 
relevant state practice advancing a general prohibition against unregulated fishing on the high seas. 
The material content of the practice, the likely condition of the United States and the EU as specially-
affected states and their interactions vis-à-vis treaty non-members are all important aspects that 
contribute to a customary change. These unilateral measures should also be regarded as potentially 
influencing an evolution in opinio juris, which should not be interpreted as a search for a consolidated 
sense of legal obligation or belief while the new rule is developing or emerging.  
The question of whether such a rule exists in customary international law is not new and this 
article has not attempted to answer it. Rather, it has argued that the EU and United States' trade 
measures against unregulated fishing are a form of state practice that is relevant for its formation. 
Whether there is an emerging or materialising customary rule against unregulated fishing on the high 
seas remains to be adequately explored and assessed. What is certain is that state practice is evolving, 
and depending on its generality, consistency and uniformity over time, it might signal the end of the 
freedom to fish as it has been understood since the adoption of UNCLOS.  
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